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Symbol and Allegory:
From Goethe to Lukacs,
from Marx to Benjamin
Romano Luperini

1. GOETHE

As is well known, the distinction between symbol and allegory becomes sufficiently clear only at the end of the eighteenth
century. It is in August and September of 1797, on the occasion of
an epistolary exchange with Schiller, that Goethe begins to articulate the different characteristics of each of them. The fortune of
symbol and misfortune of allegory, lasting almost without interruption up to the present day, have their beginnings then-and
this is perhaps not an insignificant detail-at the threshold of the
modern era.
In the aphorisms of Maxims and Reflectionswe read: 1
It matters a great deal whether the poet is seeking the particular for
the universal, or seeing the universal in the particular. The former
process gives rise to allegory, in which the particular serves only as
an instance or example of the universal; the latter, on the other
hand, is the true nature of poetry, it gives expression to the particu-

[Translated from the Italian by Nelson Moe. Originally published in
Allegoria, no. 6, 1990.J
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lar without in any way thinking of, or referring to, the universal.
And he who vividly grasps the particular will at the same time also
grasp the universal, and will either not become aware of it at all, or
will do so long afterwards.
That is true Symbolism in which the particular represents the universal, not as a dream or a shadow, but as a living, instantaneous
revelation of the Inscrutable.
Allegory transforms the phenomenon into a concept, the concept
into an image; but in such a way that in the image the concept may
ever be preserved, circumscribed and complete, at hand and
expressible.
Symbolism transforms the phenomenon into an idea, the idea into
an image, in such a way that in the image the idea still remains
unattainable and for ever effective, and, though it be expressed in
all languages, yet remains inexpressible.

In his Prolegomena to a Marxist Aesthetics and Aesthetics,
Lukacs turns to these maxims on a number of occasions, emphasizing their anti-romantic and classical charge. He focuses his
attention above all on the difference between the concept,proper
to allegory, and the idea, proper to the symbol, and, in a more
oblique fashion, on the notion of "inexpressibility" that characterizes the symbol. While the idea is the "synthesis of a totality,"
because it confers on the image both the content of the phenomenon, with its vital richness, and its ideality, the concept is
only a "fixed and univocal reflection, dis-anthropomorphic,
abstracted from objective reality," because it goes beyond its sensible immediacy without preserving it and indeed locks the separation between perception
and rational content into an
irremediable dualism. As for "inexpressibility," this , in Lukacs'
reading, would only allude to the inexhaustability of the real, to
the "intensive and extensive infinity of real objects," and thus to
the necessar y inadequacy of all languages. 2
If Lukacs is undoubtedly correct in pointing out the strong
classical tendency of the Goethean theoretical perspective (and, as
we will see shortly, other arguments can be added to support this
claim), his concern to distance Goethe's reflections from the
romantic sphere prevents him from grasping their full range of
implications and, specifically, from investigating the question of
the "inexpressibility" of symbolic figuration.
According to Goethe, in the case of the symbol, the poet sees
in the particular the universal; in the case of allegory he seeks the
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particular in function of the universal. The opposition see/seek(in
the German text: schaut/sucht) implies two different operations:
one tied to the sense of vision, perception and intuition (in the
etymological sense of the term as well), the other to investigation
and reflection. In the first case one finds the truth immediately,
without seeking it; in the second a process of research is necessary, because there is a distance between the particular and universal that must be overcome (and there is no guarantee that this
research will be successful) . The first is instantaneous, the second
presupposes duration in time. The symbol presents itself as a
unity of appearance and essence which perception grasps concretely and simultaneously; allegory, instead, is subject to their
division, and because of this requires the moment of abstraction
and chronological succession. The latter is defined through the
abstraction of a concept extraneous to the appearance, the former
through the sensible perception of the idea that appears in the
object. Because of the coincidence between perception and the
revelation of truth, consciousness and will are not involved in the
symbol, whereas in allegory awareness and rational detachment
are indispensable.
While the symbol-transforming
the phenomenon into an idea and the idea into an image-captures
the
limitlessness of the whole through an intuitive act and can therefore never demonstrate it adequately, so that it "remains inexpressible," vice versa allegory, transforming the phenomenon into
a concept and the concept into an image, can express the truth
that is proper to it without residue, because this truth remains
limited ("circumscribed"), referring not to a total and natural
meaning but rather to an intellectual one that is subjective and
conventional. In sum: the reason for the "inexpressibility" of the
symbol has to do with its very nature, which is to say with its
intrinsic epistemological modalities, not so much, or not only,
with the nature of language and with the inexhaustability of the
real, as Lukacs interprets it.
From this point of view, Goethe's position may have an element of more than casual affinity with romantic theories , however
different from them it is, sharing with them the nexus of perc eption-appearance-essence, itself declinable either in the direction of
classicism or of modern symbolism. Obviously Goethe has in
mind the classical plasticity of the symbol, the unity of the ideal
and appearance. In the twinkling of an eye, in the instantaneousness of a glance, in a moment (as, not by chance, in the German,
Augenblick), the infinitude of perfection takes place. But the
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momentary totality of the symbol can also assume-as in Novalis,
and in the exact same year, in fact the same months-a magical
and mystic dimension. When Novalis claims to grasp through
the symbol the profound and impalpable link that brings together
nature and interiority in a unitary whole and declares in Hymns to
the Night that "Rivers, trees, flowers, animals, everything had a
human sense," 3 we are already at the beginning of a line of
thought that will lead to the Baudelairian theorization of the correspondences. Modernity will entail a movement away from the
organic harmoniousness of classicism, the progressive autonomization and dissociation of sensible perception, the exasperated
refinement and progressive specialization, as it were, of the perceptive capacities of the senses, with a dual and in some way
divided consequence.
On the one hand, as diverse sensorial
capacities gradually develop in the arts, the necessity emerges to
invent a language for lyric poetry that is adequate to them and
thus ever more special and sectorial, ever more inclined to reflect
upon itself, and thus highly phonosymbolic and allusive-it is the
tendency towards linguistic self-reflexivity that asserts itself at the
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century,
both at the theoretical level, in the studies of linguistics and poetics, and in the literary practice of symbolism and postsymbolism.4 On the other hand, the natural or metaphysical
totality that such a linguistic and poetic specialization apparently
signals loses all possibility of plasticity and concreteness and is
actually asserted with a force and stubbornness commensurate
with its vagueness. If the intuited whole is increasingly remote
and inaccessible, if nature itself tends to be presented in poetry as
the imitation of a nature that no longer exists, or exists less and
less (in Italy, D' Annunzio's imitation of nature is exemplary), the
originary theological essence of the symbol is turned upside
down in a paradoxical religion: that of an art which, claiming to
have the capacity to grasp a whole which, beyond it, is by now
out of its reach, is reduced to admiring itself. The link between
aestheticism, specialization and linguistic self-reflexivity, and the
imitation of a natural or metaphysical entirety that is perceptible
with ever greater difficulty, is the abiding trait of modern symbolism. And Kitsch is organic with it.5
We are clearly quite far from the classicism of Goethe. And
yet the accord between poetry and life that symbolism and modern aestheticism presuppose undoubtedly finds in Goethe an
important antecedent.
His insistence on the "inscrutable,"
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"unattainable,"
"inexpressible" (unerforschlichen, unereichbar,
unaussprechlich,in German) character of the symbolic revelation of
the whole and on the involuntary nature of such perception already
signals a first consistent split with respect to the "realism of the
Enlightenment" to which Lukacs unilaterally attempted to lead him.
In fact, at the basis of the Goethean theory of the symbol as
the immediate perception of the whole and the coincidence of
appearance and essence, one finds a concept that is extraneous to
Enlightenment culture, that of Erlebnis,or of lived, authentic experience. It is Erlebnisthat guarantees the unity between poetry and
life. For Erlebnispresupposes "the whole immediately"; its meaning, Gadamer observes, is "infinite." 6 Erlebnis is a "moment of
infinite life" and in its instantaneous and immediate character
at once detaches itself from the continuum of life and is in relation
with the totality of lives of everyone .... In the measure in which it
belongs to the totality of life, the totality of life is present in it.

In short, to that coincidence of particular and universal proper to
the symbol corresponds that coincidence of the concrete moment
of individual experience and the totality of life in Erlebnis. And
poetry is precisely the expression of such unity.
In his definition of the symbol, Goethe alludes more than
once to the fusion of particular and universal in the vital concreteness of experience: it is a question, he writes, of grasping the "living" richness of their unity ("he who vividly grasps the living
particular will at the same time grasp the universal"), and it is by
such a path that the "living, instantaneous revelation of the
Inscrutable" will be made possible. In these statements-and
Lukacs clearly stressed this forcefully-a
polemic against the
early romantics is evident, and perhaps against Novalis himself,
for the particular must be "living," must take place in all its concreteness and "not as a dream and shadow." However, it is in
these same statements that theory of Erlebniskunstalready begins
to appear, and which, carried to the extreme and free from
Goethean classicism, will run its full course in the era of romanticism and symbolism. Gadamer rightly concludes:
The criterion of the lived, of Erlebniskunst, that Goethe himself instituted, became the dominant axiological concept in
the aesthetic field in the nineteenth century. 7
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2. LUKAC S

According to Lukacs, the importance of Goethe within the
sphere of literary history lies in the fact that in proposing "a contemporary classicism," he forms "a bridge between the realism of
the Enlightment and the grand realism of the first half of the nineteenth century." 8 In the sphere of literary theory, then, Goethe - as
we read in the Prolegomena to a Marxist Aesthetic-would
have
been the first to see "in particularity the structural category of the
aesthetic sphere" 9 and to articulate art's capacity to grasp the universal in the particular, thus anticipating the theory of types as the
mediation between phenomenon and essence. In Aesthetics
Lukacs not only underwrites the Goethean distinction between
symbol and allegory and the devaluation of the latter in favor of
the former, but declares that such a theory of the symbol appears
to him substantially in agreement with the Marxist theory of
"realistic art." '°
The line of continuity is clearly to be found in the category of
totality as the unity of phenomenon and essence, perceived, as
Goethe would say, "without becoming aware of it." The
Lukacsian notion of the "triumph of realism" -extrapolated from
a letter of Engels' -presupposes
a particular "honesty" 11 on the
part of the writer , that of forgetting himself and his own ideology:
unconsciously and almost involuntarily, obeying the logic of his
own creation, the writer thus obeys the logic of objective reality, of
its sense and development. The problem does not so much lie in
admitting a discrepancy between the consciousness of the author
and his aesthetic productions (among other things, as noted in
modern aesthetic theories, in art that which has been displaced by
the individual and repressed by society comes to the surface). It
lies rather in the fact that this dissociation comes to be posited as
the foundation of a theory of the reflection of the totality, which is
to say of a cons ciousness capabl e of grasping the meaning of the
entirety of an historical process. Whereas Goethe conceives of a
natural whole, of the man-world unity that can be perceived by
intuition, the Lukacsian concept of totality slips from the natural
and ontological level to the socio -historical.
In fact, in the 130 years that divide these two different theo rizations, the dissociation and specialization of modernity have
already brought about drastic divisions in the theoretical imagi nary. In place of the concepts of intuition and perception, Lukacs
substitutes that of reflection, seeking then to annul the risks of
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passivity inherent in this concept by postulating the mediating
category of the particular and the typical: the latter, in fact, occurs
only in the presence of a "taking a position" with regard to
humanity's greatest problems. The question of how such "taking
a position" can be reconciled with the artist's "honesty," with his
forgetting himself and his ideology, may at this point seem an
unresolved theoretical contradiction. We will briefly see that this
is not really the case. For the moment, let it suffice to note that the
risk of such a contradiction could not exist instead in Goethe, who
remained constant in his ontologico-natural conception of totality,
where obviously the problem of "taking a position" and, to an
even greater extent, of awareness and thus of the rational and
abstract moment, could be so much more easily denied or
ignored. The problem lies in the fact that Lukacs wants to preserve for art the same characteristics of naturalness, spontaneity
and superior honesty that belong to every Erlebniskunst (and it is
precisely such a theoretical orientation that safeguards him from
any risk of Zdanovism), but then his Erlebnis passes from the level
of the relationship between self and nature, self and the world, to
that of the relationship between subject and society. The universal itself becomes in Lukacs the "social universal." The type is
still Goethe's "living particular," but in it converge the social traits
of an historical epoch:
The type is characterized by the fact that in it converge and intertwine in a living, contradictory unity all the salient traits of that
dynamic unity in which true literature reflects life: all the most
important social and moral and psychological contradictions of an
epoch .... In the figuration of the type, in typical art, concreteness
and the norm are fused, the eternal human element and the historically determinate, individuality and social universality. For this
reason, in the creation of types, in the presentation of characters
and typical situations, the most important tendencies of social evolution find adequate artistic expression. 12

In short, with Lukacs it is necessary to speak of a new type of
Erlebnis. It entirely consists in the refusal of Flaubertian impassibilite, in the participation in the social, in taking a position. Such
"participation" seems to be the necessary condition of "honesty"
with which the writer, whatever his specific levels of political and
ideological consciousness, succeeds in reflecting the global process of history. It is this, in short, which guarantees the possibility
of distinguishing between the essential and non-essential, mere
accidental singularity from the particularity that contains the uni-
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versa! within it. "Participation"
thus becomes the true and
authentic experience by which the great writer is "spoken" and
thus induced-even
despite himself-to see the essence in the
multiplicity of phenomena. Only through "participation" does
the mediation of the particular offer itself. And it is here, in this
specific form of Erlebnis,that the contradiction between the affirmation of the natural and spontaneous character of artistic creation and the necessity of taking a position with regard to the
"great questions of human progress" is resolved. At this point it
seems clear that "taking a position" is not to be understood in a
political or ideological sense, but as a generic and yet totalizing
ethical and sentimental attitude towards life. Thanks to the experience of "participation" and the consequent "taking a position,"
the writer places himself in contact with the most significant historical contents of his time and "with the true and profound
dialecticity of reality," which then passes spontaneously into the
logic of the creative work, despite the very political convictions of
the author. Upon closer inspection, if the writer participates in
the flux of historical reality, it is not so much he who chooses
those contents (and it goes without saying just how important the
content is for Lukacs), as it is the contents that choose him. The
circle of literature and life is thus confirmed. Again, it does not
take place through detachment or intellectual abstraction: it is
participation as Erlebnis,as "being part" of a whole, that is the site
of mediation between phenomenon and essence and thus the
guarantee of the just reflection of the totality.
The mediation of the typical thrusts itself upon the great
realist-symbolist writer with a force which is at once natural and
historical: the force of teleologism. History has already become
the new nature and new metaphysics , and in fact takes their
place . From this point of view Lukacs ' theory is also the objective
reflection of a process set in motion by modernization (with the
end of a "first" nature, and the birth of a nature which, wishing to
be wholly human and historical, is instead wholly "artificial, "
etc.). In place of Goethe's classical organicism is substituted ,
without ruptures, that of the Marxist historicism of the period of
the Third International. But while the former drew its historical
legitimation from the horizon of pre-modernity
in which it
inscribed itself, the second ends up sharing many of modernity's
many ideological illusions which prevent it from looking itself in
the face (its historical teleologism, its theory of "progress," its
faith in an objective truth that springs from the very flux of
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events), at the same time it confronts modernity with a set of theoretical tools that is in many ways still pre-modern and thus incapable of seriously negotiating it.
The essay "To Narrate or Describe" brings to a maximum
level of transparency the Lukacsian theory of social Erlebnisas the
condition of an art that is both realistic and symbolic. Here the
contrast between Scott, Balzac and Tolstoy on the one hand and
Flaubert and Zola on the other is presented as the contradiction
between participationand observation,and thus between two different ways of situating oneself in relation to life. In the first
group the accidental is always transported beyond the realm of
the incidental and into the realm of necessity; in the second it
remains a mere descriptive detail, unmotivated both at the level
of historical reality and at that of the corresponding narrative teleologism that should reflect it. In this case, too, Lukacs' theoretical
referent is a passage of Goethe's, in which the "fundamental quality of the living unity" is located in the fact that "the most particular event presents itself always as an image and symbol of the
most universal." 13 Only the refusal of detached observation and
participation allow the artist to attain such a unity and to obtain a
dual result: with regard to style, the narrationand thus insertion of
the specific and accidental into the totality of reality; with regard
to its effects, the insertion of the reader into the vital experience of
art, his participation in its totality. "We live" the events "narrated" by Scott, Balzac or Tolstoy, writes Lukacs; "we observe" those
"described" by Flaubert or Zola. 14 Estrangement appears to be
irreconcilable with realism. "Description" is nothing but the
result of a detached, self-reflexive, abstract, "professional" attitude on the part of the writer under the constraint of social "solitude" and thus incapable of participating in the historical totality.
The art of Flaubert and Zola is deeply marked by this lack of

Erlebnis:
Flaubert and Zola ... did not actively participate in the life of this
society; nor did they wish to .... They can but choose solitude, and
become observers and critics of bourgeois society. But with this
they become at the same time professional writers, writers in the
sense of the capitalist division of labor. 15

On the one hand Lukacs takes stock of the inevitable consequences of modernity at the social and aesthetic levels (the impossibility of "participation" and the commodification of art); on the
other hand such consequences lead him to an unconditional con-
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demnation: the writer's acceptance of the capitalist division of
labor, parceling out his existence and leading him to professional
specialization, prevent him from participating in the totality of life
and, robbing him of the possibility of a mediation of the typical,
lead him either towards the flat imitation of the phenomenon (as
with the naturalists) or towards the abstract admiration of the
universal (as happens with the symbolist poets). It is here that we
find the source of Lukacs' radical incomprehension with regard to
modern art. He remains a prisoner of his nostalgia for a pre-modern art, one still characterized by a primitive and scarcely specialized division of labor, by the harmonic organicity of the classical
symbol or by the Erlebnisspringing from a romantic participation
in the rhythm of history. In this lies both the greatness of his
utopian vision and his limit. His vision of the past was, as we
well know, a dream for the future. But the divide that he marks
out between narrating and describing, participating and observing,
holds him back from the comprehension of an epoch and an art
marked from top to bottom by commodity fetishism, by the discrepancy between signifier and signified, between the phenomenon and an essence ever more fleeting or actually
nonexistent, by the accidental, the randomly singular, by the fragment in itself that is neither necessitated nor redeemed, and thus
by the logic of allegory rather than by that of the symbol.
The theoretical refusal of allegorism in Lukacs is the other
side of his political refusal of the modern. He was of course by no
means unaware that capitalist modernity irrevocably split appear ance and essence off from one another, but he voluntaristically
demanded that realist art succeed in overcoming this division
(out of this too arises his discomfort with the second Faust, in
which Goethe, needing to represent the reality of emerging mod ernization, must have recourse to allegory). 16 For Lukacs, a world
dominated by confusion and, at the aesthetic level, by the description of confusion must be radically refuted; it can only express an
art that must have appeared to him, from one point of view, as an
indirect apology for the situation created by capitalist development and, from another, a surrender to nihilism. Lukacs does not
see that modernization already denies any art that would have a
realistic or cognitive value the possibility of Erlebnis and of
Erlebniskunst, taking away any real basis it might have; and that
the description of confusion is not necessarily, as Benjamin
observes in the same years, "a confused description." 17

ROMANO LUPER/NI

101

3. MARX

Notwithstanding
Lukacs' assiduous reelaboration of the
occasional notes on art that Marx and Engels left behind, it is
impossible to make out a theory of the symbol or an organic
vision of the typical as mediation between the singular and universal in these writings. The two founders of historical materialism limit themselves to stating their preferences in the field of
drama and the contemporary novel for situations and characters
that are typical insofar as they are capable of representing not
only specific events and concrete individuals but, through these,
social and historical conditions. 18 But they never state their views
on the particular cognitive modalities of the aesthetic process as
such. Rather they elaborated, above all in the economic writings
(but not only in these), a theory of modernity that may also have
interesting implications in the field of aesthetics.
For the later Marx, modernity is not a political phenomenon
produced by the French Revolution, as he had maintained in his
early writings, but rather an eminently social and economic process, begun some decades after it and characterized by the permanently innovative nature of big industry, by the progressive
generalization of exchange value, by commodity fetishism, by the
formation of a "second" artificial nature that takes the place of the
first one. And yet, even though the commodity and its logic are
unrivaled in their domination of the modern panorama, they do
not "appear," they seem not to have a real, sensible manifestation.
As is well known, for Marx the "enigmatic" and "mystical" character of the commodity 19 depend on the fact that its value, by now
disconnected from its specific use values and the concrete labor
that produced it, presents itself as "natural." The totality which
takes the place of nature in the modern is not history, as in the
thought of Lukacs, but the "second" nature of the market.
In the commodity, the particular and universal no longer
mutually convert into one another, for not only is there a difference between the product and the value, but-as Marx writes in
the Grundrisse - an "antithesis" and a "contradiction." 20 Two
somewhat paradoxical consequences result from this: on the one
hand the gap within the commodity between appearance and
essence presents itself as unbridgeable, so that its structure is
intrinsically allegorical; on the other hand, the world of reification, offering itself as a "new" nature, also presents itself from an
ideological point of view as the new site of a possible Erlebnis, so
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that the commodity, developing its enigmatic and mystical character that allows it to hide its material matrices, can reveal an
"aura" and a sacrality and assume the characteristics of the symbol. On the one hand the division between "natural" (or "material") existence and the "economic existence" of the commodity is
not an ideological illusion, and in fact there is a "real separation"
between the reality of the commodity and its value,21 so that its
value can be arbitrarily and conventionally attributed and can
allegorically transform itself - Marx writes-into
a "mere sign,
into a letter that takes the place of a relation of production"; 22 on
the other hand the "real separation" becomes the ideological reality, its concrete foundation, so that the particular value of the commodity, by now rendered autonomous of any of its concrete
determinations, brings with it an immediate and simultaneous
access to the universal, and, that is, to the whole of its "new"
nature and value as such. The social origin of ideology does not
lie in some maneuver of the ruling class but in this singular and
extremely material inversion produced by commodity fetishism
that transforms an allegorical reality into a symbolic one.
The Marxist theory of ideology is consubstantial with modernity, which is to say with the structure of the commodity, and is
thus basically complementary to and homogeneous with the theory of reification . Appearance and essence together cease to exist.
With modernity an epoch opens in which, at the level of consciousness, the only possible hermeneutic is that of suspicion. It
is no longer possible to trust perception; estrangement is necessary, the moment of analytic abstraction. It is no longer possible
to have access to totality naturally and spontaneously; on the contrary, ideological demystification is necessary, the inversion of the
inversion. Meaning no longer naturally springs from the order of
things and from the living unity of the whole, but can only be the
inevitably partial result of an operation of inversion that is at once
theoretical and practical, an operation that therefore pertains to
the critique of ideology and of praxis, to the conflict of interpretations and to the lengthy process of research and struggle.
If the reality of modernity is the divided and allegorical reality of the commodity, it seems unlikely for it to be compatible with
that harmonic co-penetration between particular and universal
that was theorized by Goethe and that Lukacs reproposed as a
still relevant model. Rather, the theoretical schema of the Marxist
analysis of the modern themselves turn out to be quite different
from, if not actually incompatible with, those of Lukacsian realism.
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4. B ENJAMIN

In the same year that Marx was studying and defining the
modern in London, working "like a madman" on the Grundrisse
(as we read in a letter to Engels of December 8, 1857), Lesfleurs du
mal appeared in Paris, in which Baudelaire represents the economic upheaval and dessication of interiority in that other capital
of modernity, deriving from it the necessity of an allegorical
choice at the aesthetic level:
Le vieux Paris n' est plus (la forme d'une ville/ change plus vite,
helas! que le coeur d'un mortel)/ / . .. Paris change! mais rien
dans ma melancolie / n'a bouge! palais neufs, echafaudages,
blocs, / vieux faubourgs, tout pour moi devient allegorie, / et mes
chers souvenirs sont plus lourds que des roes.

The German scholar of Faust, Heinz Schlaffer, juxtaposes
these verses of Baudelaire with the passage in which Goethe
refers to his theory of the symbol for the first time. 23 This is a letter to Schiller of August 16, 1797, in which, apropos of those
objects which possess a symbolic value, he remembers "the surroundings of the house, the courtyard and the garden" of his
grandfather in Frankfurt as they now appear, transformed by
"shrewdly enterprising men" into "a business and market place"
after the building had been destroyed by a bombardment .24
Goethe's Frankfurt, in short, is like Baudelaire's Paris. But in
Goethe, again, the symbol is linked to the act of seeing, that
grasps an order of things that is both natural and reasonable, sentimental and social, private and public, without breaks: the estimation of the value of the building which, though reduced to
rubble, "is still worth twice" that which his grandparents paid,
does not produce an effect of alienation, but is inserted within the
calm evaluation of an historical process governed by "wisely
enterprising men," in which the author does not hesitate to recognize himself . Vice versa, Baudelaire registers a painful discrepancy between the time of interiority and that of the events that have
overwhelmed Paris; everything becomes allegorical for him,
because his condition is not one of the man who participates, but
of an estranged man who, in his melancholy, does not perceive
analogies, coincidences, but rather reflects upon-or
"mulls
over" -the divisions within an alienated reality.
The two texts , written sixty years apart from one another,
bear the sign not only of two different artistic forms, but of two
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different epochs. According to Benjamin, in the Paris of
Baudelaire and of the Passages,with their magasins de nouveautes,
with the lights of shop windows and commodities that replaced
those of the stars, modernity was born, along with the art that
was most true to it because it was most consonant with it and
most capable of describing and knowing it: allegorical art. Nor
can it surprise us at this point that Benjamin starts precisely from
a critique of Goethe in order to set up, in the last chapter of The
Origin of German TragicDrama, his theory of allegory, and from a
study of Paris and Baudelaire, deeply influenced by the first chapter of Capital, in order to establish the relationship between
modernity and allegorism.
According to Benjamin, allegory for Goethe is not "an object
worthy of reflection," and, indeed, his definition of it is only "a
negative construction and after the fact" with respect to that of the
symbol. 25 At the same time, the history of romantic criticism that
he outlines is there to demonstrate that Goethe is situated at its
beginning and that, for this reason, the most radical opposition to
classicism could not come from romanticism but rather from the
baroque, its "majestic counterpart." 26 This observation of
Benjamin's is all the more relevant if one considers that his interest for the baroque springs directly, as he himself admits at the
end of the "Epistemological Preface," from his interest in twentieth-century expressionism, so that in point of fact the baroque
presents itself to him as an allegory of avant-garde or modern art.
In sum, Benjamin also implicitly discloses a continuity
between classicism and symbolic romanticism to which he counterposes the break represented by the line running from the
baroque to expressionism: both the baroque and expressionism,
for instance, do not conceive of art as a spontaneous and natural
process, but will art (Riegl is present in these reflections), fully
aware of its abstract and artificial character. Nor is this a merely
literary concern of Benjamin's. The political matrix is evident and
has been rightly noted by Cases:
Just as, in the baroque, allegory freed the necessity of transcendence from the slough of the transient, so modern art calls up from
the dead world of reified things and men that utopia which
Benjamin in those years identified with the Marxist classless
society. 27

Moreover, modern allegorism, as practiced for the first time by
Baudelaire, while reflecting the meaninglessness of economic
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alienation and being, so to speak, consubstantial with it, does not
limit itself to being a passive homology of it, but directs its
"destructive fury" against its appearance of totality, developing
the moment of rational and critico-negative consciousness to the
fullest.
This negative limit, highly evident in Benjamin, and it is
instilled in his investigation, as it were. His denunciation of the
idealistic historical optimism and classical organicism implicit in
the theory of the symbol is the very basis of his interest in the
baroque, in Baudelaire, in avant-garde art, which, it must be said,
he never posits as exemplary models. He does not brandish mots
d'ordre,and his militancy privileges the destructive moment over
the constructive. At the same time, within his perspective, no tradition is exempt from barbarism, as each is to be read against the
grain. He does not overlook the vanity of the baroque contemplation of vanity, and thus warns the reader of the "danger" of
falling into its "frightful abysses," inviting him to avoid identification, to remain the "master of oneself" and to maintain the selfreflexive and "detached attitude" of the allegorist. 28 As for
Baudelaire, the French poet seems to him so much a prisoner of
the horizon of reification that, as we read in Das Passagen-Werk,
the questions put to him by the tribunal of history would appear
strange and incomprehensible to him .29 And in another aphorism,
commenting on a passage in which Baudelaire defines as "magical" the stones of the Parisian pave and of the barricades of '48,
Benjamin, himself accused of magical tendencies, observes a la
Brecht that they can appear magical only because the poet lacks
the necessary knowledge and "makes no mention of the hands
that move these slabs of stone.":io
Benjamin is not thinking of an art of the future and thus, in
contrast to Lukacs, does not need to hypostasize some tradition as
a model for the future. He knows that allegory is a form of writing belonging to a condition of imprisonment, the report of an
inferno, valid not insofar as it anticipates within its framework
the traits of a new society, but insofar as it rips off masks, deconstructs false totalities, denounces a void. Its message for the
future is simultaneously bound and limited to the postulation of a
meaning beyond meaninglessness and to the faith in human reason to think it; but it has no guarantee, for the split between the
ordo rerum and ordo idearum is, in the allegorical vision, constitutive. In Benjamin allegorism is also a method of knowledge.
Implicit in it is the awareness of the necessarily partial and frag-
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mentary nature of every position and thus also of our own. There
is no totality which can verify it. In the end it will be the capacity
for knowledge and struggle that decides the result, the capacity,
that is, to study phenomena and understand them in effective
constellations of thought, effective so as to assert themselves within the conflict of interpretations and within social practice. But, in
the meantime, it is important not to mystify the limits of one's
prison.
It is no coincidence that neither the scientistic nor idealistic
tradition nor even the principal Marxist tradition have been interested in elaborating a theory of allegorism. Their penchant for the
symbol is one with the essentialistic nature of the truth in which
they recognize themselves.
Today, when the prison is more evident and the sense of limits and historical crisis inescapable, Benjaminian allegory returns
with all the rel evance of a radical and intrinsically dialectical
thought. Neither essentialistic nor dogmatic, it is capable of freeing itself from the enchantment of appearances, and thus bears a
theor etical perspective possessing a great advantage over the
dominant tradition of symbolism. Yet it is also aware of its own
poverty and capable of a continual critical vigilance over itself.
Allegory always finds in itself, in its constitutive nature, the force
to direct back at itself its own critico-negative charge. The inversion that it alludes to, signaling a possibility that cannot be
reduced to a mere act of the intellect and which refers instead to a
praxis and a future, indicates also the limit of denouncing this
infernal condition while being a part of it.
The objection that Benjamin directs against Baudelaire holds
true also with respect to ourselves. Inevitably, we too, in our
work, move stones that risk appearing magical.
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